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Abstract
The Battle of Kasserine Pass proved to be a shock both to American military forces in the field and to the American public at home. The defeat of the Allied forces in the battle put doubt into the minds of many -all of whom assumed the righteous democracies of the western Allies could not be defeated in the field by the armies of Fascism. The defeat suffered by the Allies had nothing to do with right versus wrong, however, but was very much a product of a number of operational shortcomings on the part of the Allies. Poor logistics, failures on the part of American leadership, lack of unity of effort on the part of the Allies, the lack of combat experience, and inferior equipment all combined to contribute to the failure at Kasserine. Libya in the east, pushing Rommel's Panzer Army before it. The Allies hoped to catch and destroy these forces between the two advancing armies.
From "Torch" to Tunisia
The objectives of Operation Torch were not simply military in nature, as planning for the operation had been rife with political gamesmanship among the leaders of the Allied nations.
The decision to invade North Africa "reflected the triumph of British strategic arguments over those of the Americans" as the Americans were pushing for an invasion in northern France as early as 1942. 6 American military leadership, however, was not sold on the logic or necessity of a North African campaign. General George C. Marshall, the architect of American military strategy, wanted no part of a US commitment to a Mediterranean campaign. 7 The decision to commit American troops in North Africa came directly from President Roosevelt, who overruled the advice of Marshall and his military advisers on this point. 8 As the operation began, the Americans and British hoped the French would not resist the Allied landings, and further expected French forces in North Africa would rejoin the anti-Axis alliance. In order to facilitate these hopes, the Allies designated General Dwight D. Eisenhower to command the invasion forces. With an American general leading the forces, the Allies sought to restrict any resistance from Anglophobic French officials and officers in the areas around the invasion beaches and ports. 9 Despite such measures, however, the French did put up some level of resistance at nearly every landing point. Nonetheless, dissension among the various French factions in North Africa limited the cohesiveness and effectiveness of the opposition.
Ultimately, the magnitude and rapidity of the Allied invasion narrowly ensured the success of the invasion, though much was still required to bring together the warring French factions. Battles of Sidi Bou Zid and Kasserine. Through much of the month of January, Axis attacks puzzled Allied commanders as Axis forces often abandoned key positions and tended to limit their own advances. 25 At the end of January, German forces attacked the French, who were defending Faid Pass. This attack disrupted Allied plans for an offensive drive against Maknassy, as Allied commanders were torn on whether to continue their planned offensive or move armored forces to the Faid Pass region to mount a counterattack on the Germans. 26 The indecision and confusion of the Allies allowed the Germans to continue their attack. On In addition to the defeats in the field, American forces were suffering from falling morale, indicated by the huge stocks of equipment abandoned by American troops in their rush to fall back. 32 The U.S. Army Center of Military History brochure on the Tunisian campaign asserts, "in a final insult, the disastrous series of defeats was ended not by stiffening American resolve but by a shift in Axis priorities." 33 Although the Germans were successful in the first week of their counteroffensive, Rommel's forces did not have the fuel to continue the advance, and he was also forced to turn back to the east to defend against Montgomery's Eighth Army as they advanced into southern Tunisia. 34 The Americans had suffered humiliating defeats, with II Corps suffering nearly 6,000 casualties at Sidi Bou Zid and Kasserine before Rommel's army had been forced to disengage and pull back from their advances.
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Figure 2 The Push into Tunisia
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The Role of Logistics
As discussed at the opening of this essay, the initial defeat of the U.S. II Corps at Kasserine and Sidi Bou Zid was a shock to the U.S. Army and the general public. However, by examining some of the operational constraints as well as operational decisions made by the American and Allied leaders, one can begin to see how these issues contributed to the defeat at Kasserine. One such contributing factor to the Allied failure at Kasserine was logistics. One of the greatest challenges for the Allied forces in their operations across North Africa and in Tunisia proved to be logistics. As they moved into Tunisia, the original Allied aim was to seize lines of communication as well as to gain control of the port cities. Additionally, they intended to trap and destroy Rommel's army. However, these operational and strategic objectives soon fell by the wayside, as Allied logistics problems came to a head. Eventually, Eisenhower realized his most pressing task was not strategy but overseeing the complex logistical requirements that began with organizing a transportation system between Algeria and Tunisia.
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The Logistics Trail
Much of the logistics problem stemmed from decisions made during the planning for Operation Torch. Eisenhower and his deputy, General Mark Clark, had assumed the Torch forces would act primarily as an occupying army rather than an offensive striking force. In planning for Torch, Eisenhower and Clark had ignored the recommendations of their logisticians, choosing to devote limited shipping space to tens of thousands of extra troops at the expense of vehicles and arms. Now, the forces they had planned to use as an army of occupation were now compelled to act as an offensive army. However, because of the acute shortage of vehicles, most units were immobile. 37 In planning for the North African campaign, the overconfident Americans believed there would be little significant resistance and felt they would achieve their objectives of securing Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia by Christmas. This was not to be the case.
In addition to planning errors, Allied logistics were complicated by the distances that had to be traversed from port cities to the Tunisian front. During the Torch operation, Algiers was the easternmost port city captured by the Allies. However, it was nearly 500 miles from Algiers to the developing front in Tunisia. "The distance from Algiers to the Tunisian battlefront was vast, and the road net was extremely primitive…Along the Mediterranean ran the only railroad, originally built by the French and in uncertain condition…Resupply was to become the single most difficult problem facing the Allies during the Tunisian campaign." 38 Resupply problems
were not limited to the Tunisian front however, but were afflicting Allied troop concentrations throughout the theater. Writing from Oran on 7 January 1943, Captain Ernest Hatfield states, "this city is so far in advance of main supply that everything is hard to get." 39 Logistics support problems were most hurtful to units conducting front line operations.
Food, fuel, and ammunition were absolutely essential to the continuance of combat operations in Tunisia. Nonetheless, the Allies' immature logistical system was unable to resupply any large force to the east. Accordingly, nearly two-thirds of the combat forces landed in Operation Torch were still in western Morocco and unavailable for combat commitment. 41 The inability of the Allies to supply and support additional troops in Tunisia eventually resulted in further fragmentation of American forces along the Tunisian front. 42 The fragmented forces of the US II Corps on the southern flank of the Allied front were "deployed across a large area … vulnerable to attack and defeat in detail by superior Axis forces." 43 In an attempt to alleviate the poor disposition of Allied forces along the Tunisian front, 
Violating the Principles of War
Logistics problems alone did not fashion the situation for failure of the Allied forces in Tunisia however. The operations of the Allies were also hampered because they violated several principles of warfare in this campaign. Specifically, the principles of mass, unity of command and security were not properly applied in this scenario, hindering the efforts of the Allies.
Mass
Current U.S. Army doctrine defines mass as concentrating the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time. Field Manual 3-0 states, "commanders mass the effects of combat power to overwhelm enemies or gain control of the situation." 46 Rather than being massed however, the U.S. II Corps was thinly deployed across a large area, increasing their vulnerability to attack and defeat by the superior Axis forces. 47 Instead of establishing defense in depth, American infantry forces were spread across isolated djebels (hills) and both armored and infantry reserves were likewise scattered in small pockets along the front.
The penalty for these unsound dispositions was paid in February, when Axis units inflicted disastrous defeats at Sidi-Bou-Zid and Kasserine Pass. Two of von Arnim's veteran panzer divisions surprise-attacked with vastly superior firepower and quickly chewed up units of the 1 st Armored Division at Sidi-Bou-Zid. American units were deployed in so-called penny-packet formations (independent, self-contained, self-supporting, brigade-size forces) that the British had used with disastrous consequences in 1941-42 … Farther south a GermanItalian battle group of Rommel's Afrika Korps advanced with little opposition and attacked U.S. forces defending the Kasserine Pass, with equally grave consequences. There the American commander had not bothered to occupy the commanding terrain of the hillsides but instead had deployed his troops across the valley floor. 
Unity of Command
The principle of mass was not the only principle of war that was misapplied by the Allies in the Tunisian campaign. Unity of command directs that "for every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander." 51 The purpose of unity of command is to direct and coordinate actions of forces toward a common objective. However, in a coalition environment, "unified action creates situations where the military commander does not directly control all elements in the area of operations. In the absence of command authority, commanders cooperate, negotiate, and build consensus to achieve unity of effort." 52 As has already been mentioned, the Allies were having great difficulty in ensuring unity of effort let alone unity of command in North Africa.
Coalition Warfare. When engaged in coalition warfare, national interests as well as desires for publicity and prominence tend to dominate the relationship among allies. 53 Achieving unity of command is nearly impossible in coalition warfare as it "is circumscribed by a special kind of courtesy that inhibits unified, cohesive, and quick action." 54 Despite Eisenhower's attempts to create a truly Allied command structure in North Africa, all that he was able to achieve was a loose coalition. 55 Field commanders were confronted with often insoluble problems stemming both from differences in national interest and outlook as well as individual personality and character.
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Discussing the role of leadership in coalition warfare, Martin
Blumenson argues, "the exercise of command is not only a matter of organizational structure, doctrine, and authority; it is also a matter of personality-each commander commands in a personal manner. In times of tactical success, frictions among men tend to be overlooked or minimized; in times of operational adversity, annoyances develop into irritations and contribute their own influences on a deteriorating situation." 57 The latter situation was very much the case in late January to mid-February of 1943 within the Allied structure.
Eisenhower was generally able to control such problems at Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ), but field commanders had greater difficulty controlling these problems. Part of the problem with unity of effort stemmed from the way in which combat troops had been employed.
On several occasions, U.S. troops were employed in piecemeal fashion, with little regard for unit integrity, and merged with British elements. Additionally, American commanders and soldiers believed the British were being favored in the choice of missions, equipment, and supplies. Rommel would attack further to the north at Fondouk, with diversionary attacks at Faid and Gafsa. 68 As a result, combat commands of the U.S. 1 st Armored Division were shifted northward to Fondouk to meet the perceived threat.
Brigadier Eric Mockler-Ferryman was in charge of intelligence analysis at AFHQ.
Intelligence information regarding the posturing of German forces along the Eastern Dorsale had been decoded by Ultra in England and been relayed to Mockler-Ferryman in Algiers. 69 However, there had been changes made at the Italian Comando Supremo in early February reducing the ability of AFHQ to acquire and access routine signal traffic of the enemy forces. 70 As a result, Mockler-Ferryman and his staff were relying primarily on Ultra intercepts flowing from Bletchley Park to build their battlefield intelligence picture. Because of the muddled nature of data available, Mockler-Ferryman's staff drew the wrong conclusions from the details provided from Ultra. 71 They passed information to the front that Axis forces could be expected to organize a major assault at the Fondouk Pass in the Eastern Dorsal. In addition to his hesitancy in resolving problems with subordinate commanders, Eisenhower tended to be rather tentative and risk-averse as the commander of the Allied North African campaign. Stephen Ambrose assessed Eisenhower in the following manner:
Eisenhower might have done better in his first command had he left behind him the emphasis on an orderly, systematic advance that he had imbibed at C&GS, and instead adopted the attitude Patton had expressed back in 1926, when he told Eisenhower always to remember that "victory in the next war will depend on EXECUTION not PLANS." But Eisenhower had been a staff officer for twenty years and could not shake the patterns of thought that had become second nature to him. He concentrated on administrative matters and politics, and insisted on an orderly, rather than a bold and risky, advance, even when his superiors urged him to take more chances…In his first command experience, Eisenhower had shown both strengths and weaknesses. His greatest success had been in welding an Allied team together, especially at AFHQ…But at the point of attack, he had shown a lack of that ruthless, driving force that would lead him to take control of a tactical situation and, through the power of his personality, extract that extra measure of energy that might have carried the Allies into Tunis or Sardinia. 81 Part of the problem confronting Eisenhower was he had become caught up in running AFHQ, shuffling paper, and coping with political consequences from Torch. Instead of focusing his attention on the duty of running the battle in Tunisia, which could not be accomplished from Algiers, four hundred miles away, Eisenhower was overly engaged in the political aspects of Allied command. 82 Following the Battle of Kasserine Pass however, Eisenhower proved to be a quick study and showed his willingness to institute change and learn from his mistakes. Fredendall had employed nearly two hundred engineers for more than three weeks on this project, which was later abandoned, unfinished, under the German threat at Kasserine. 93 The common G.I. could not miss the fact that Fredendall was very far-removed from the activity.
"At the front, American vulnerability was obvious to the lowest-ranking private soldiers, even if their senior commanders were too remote to grasp the situation. Soldiers possess a marvelous ability to reduce events to their simplest common denominator. And so it was in Tunisia, with an unnamed GI's pithy observation that, 'Never were so few commanded by so many from so far away!'" 94 By the time of Kasserine, Fredendall's corps headquarters was located nearly sixty-five miles from the front in a huge underground bunker concealed in a gorge. 95 Soldiers in the Corps disparagingly referred to the headquarters as "Lloyd's very last resort" or "Shangr-la, a million miles from nowhere." 
Lessons Learned
The failure at Kasserine Pass proved to be a temporary tactical setback for the American and Allied forces. Despite the various operational failings on the part of the Allies, and particularly the Americans, Axis forces were unable to make any strategic gains from their victories over the period from 14-21 February. Ultimately, the Americans learned much from their failures in this campaign -lessons that would be carried over to the ensuing campaigns in Sicily, Italy, and northern France. inability to apply their training to the existing battle conditions and he was appalled by numerous examples of poor discipline. 101 He realized the role of commanders to instill the necessary discipline among the troops and also the importance of ensuring combat forces received proper training and equipment. A commander such as Fredendall who spent his time some 65-miles away from his forces could not ensure the combat troops were battle-ready and disciplined.
As previously mentioned, Fredendall did not champion the ideals of centralized control and decentralized execution, as he failed to entrust subordinate commanders with the necessary initiative and authority to act on their own. In his many diary entries, Captain . The Germans will be quite surprised." 106 Beyond the need for improved equipment, Eisenhower recommended that training be improved for forces entering the military to better prepare units for the rigors of combat as they had experienced in North Africa. Additionally, the Americans realized the need to improve upon the coordination between air and ground forces in a combined-arms warfare concept.
Again, Captain Hatfield's diaries encapsulate these changes as they were occurring. On 5 March 1943, he wrote, "we had lunch with the Air Corps and then went to Bou Chekba to a meeting of our officers. Col Howze was conducting a tactical walk and discussion on the ground east of Bou Chekba. It was very interesting and instructive." 107 Hatfield wrote further on 7 March, "Gen Patton and Gen Bradley came down after lunch. We all went to the tactical walk on the combined arms, near Bou Chekba." 108 The coming offensive drive to the Tunisian seaboard would show greatly improved integration of ground and air forces. In due course, all these lessons and changes were incorporated and played a role in the eventual Allied victory in Europe.
Summary
The U.S. Army's performance at the various engagements of the Battle of Kasserine Pass clearly illustrates the effect of operational level decisions on the conduct of tactical operations.
At Kasserine, U.S. and Allied forces were plagued by a poor, slowly emerging logistics system.
The shortcomings of the logistics system produced shortages of equipment and personnel, and ultimately had an effect on the deployment of forces on the front lines. In addition to logistics, the poor employment of forces on the Tunisian front resulted from decisions made by field commanders-decisions that resulted in forces being thinly dispersed and poorly massed for 
